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 1 
COMPARATIVE CONCEPTS AND CONNECTIVE INTEGRATION 
Paper to be presented at the Fifth Benelux-Scandinavian  
Conference on Legal Theory: European Legal  
Integration and Analytical Legal Theory,  
Maastricht, 28.-29.10.2002 
The Core Issue of this Paper 
The object of this study is so-called “connective integration”: conceptual 
relationships between rules of two or more Member States. The issue of this paper 
is the suitability of comparative concepts for integration studies. The core issue1 of 
this paper is how conceptual analysis in microcomparison2 can contribute to 
acquiring knowledge about connective integration. In the context of integration, the 
applicability of comparative concepts is an open question. 
Comparative concepts 
“Comparative concepts” are concepts that belong to comparative law research and 
that enable us to articulate relationships between rules of two or more Member 
States. The comparative concept identifies legal rules within different systems and 
detects similarities between these rules. It is not necessary, however, to incorporate 
the comparative concept into national law. This concept is not a source of law, but 
a source of knowledge. 
Comparative concepts are useful to comparative law research since the first 
problem the researcher will meet is that terminological resemblance does not 
guarantee any conceptual correspondence fixing the comparability of the rules of 
different legal systems. ‘Pflichtteil’ in German law only creates an obligation to 
pay a substitute in money for the value of the share which an heir has in the 
heritage. The same German word ‘Pflichtteil’ means something else in e.g. Swiss 
law: in Swiss law the ‘Pflichtteil’ is the guaranteed part of the heritage itself; it is 
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1  The European integration process relies on the legal systems of Member States. Comparative law 
can be useful to connect these legal systems by selecting the rules considered to be the best 
possible solution to the legal problem that asks for integration. However, this practical matter is 
not the core issue of this paper. 
2  Micocomparison is the investigation of legal rules of one system and the equivalent rules in at 
least one other system. 
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not the value of a share in the heritage. For the rest the Swiss ‘Pflichtteil’ is 
equivalent to the French ‘réserve’. 
Comparative concepts are useful to comparative law research and may be suitable 
for integration studies in particular. After all, real referents are important to 
describe the state of connective integration. Especially, it is important to acquire 
knowledge about the extent to which the diverse elements of legal systems are 
connected with one another. This implies that the criteria for comparative concepts 
must be observable and unequivocal, enabling us to investigate empirically the 
rules belonging to different legal systems. In order to comply with this, the 
comparatist must test the so-called “comparability assumption” on the legal 
systems compared. Since he wants to study real referents of the comparative 
concept, the comparatist needs the “comparability assumption”. This starting point 
is a falsifiable hypothesis, a proposition constructed with a comparative concept 
and formulated in a metalanguage. The comparability assumption can be either true 
or false. 
As I have analysed in my doctoral dissertation,3 there are three forms of 
comparative concepts: extensional concepts, functional concepts and immanent 
concepts. These forms will be distinguished in this paper before examining their 
relative usefulness in connective integration. Examples will illustrate the 
characteristics of the three forms of comparative concepts. 
Extensional concepts 
First, the formation of extensional concepts seems an option to describe the state of 
an integration process. The formation of extensional concepts is the listing of 
common elements which may be present in several legal systems. These common 
elements are to be found at the intersection of different sets of legal rules, or parts 
of rules, belonging to different systems. In this approach, the national sets of rules 
could be identified by means of legal terms, e.g. the Dutch ‘appartementsrecht’, the 
German ‘Wohnungseigentum’ and the French ‘copropriété des immeubles bâtis’. 
The extensional concept of ‘apartment ownership’ should refer to the common 
elements at the intersection. 
I have developed the following arguments against extensional concepts: national 
terms cannot identify the common elements of, e.g., ‘apartment ownership’. The 
juxtaposition of legal rules that have been identified by legal terms is not sufficient 
to conclude that common elements are present. These rules continue to be 
completely different things having different names. After all, the national terms 
‘Diebstahl’ and ‘theft’ only refer to German and English rules, respectively, 
without relating these rules. Legal rules to be compared do not provide their own 
comparability. Without choosing any intension for the comparative concept, you 
cannot compare apples and oranges. The intersection containing the common 
elements can only be identified if the common characteristics of these rules are 
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known. Rules are at the intersection of different legal systems if and only if they 
have the characteristics included in the common intension of the comparative 
concept. 
Terminological resemblance does not guarantee any conceptual correspondence 
and does not signal any connective integration of elements of different legal 
systems. Knowledge about the properties of the comparative concept is vital in 
articulating relationships between rules of two or more Member States. Therefore, 
it has to be discussed which concepts are useful to integration: functional concepts 
on the one hand, or immanent concepts on the other. 
Functional concepts 
Functional concepts are guiding the comparative inquiry into the social and 
economic problems addressed in different legal systems. According to Zweigert 
and Kötz,4 a social function is the common perspective the researcher needs. They 
state that rules of different legal systems can be compared if they serve the same 
function. In their view, the legal rules of every society essentially face the same 
problems. As Zweigert and Kötz are sceptical of the conceptual constructs of 
particular nations, complete abstraction from national concepts is to be achieved 
with the help of functional concepts. Thus instead of asking, ‘What formal 
requirements are there for sales contracts in foreign law?’, they prefer to ask ‘How 
does foreign law protect parties from surprise?’ In this exemplary phrasing, 
Zweigert and Kötz omit the legal concepts of 'formal requirements' and of 'sales 
contracts'. All this implies that the legal system is not so much a conceptual 
structure, but rather an instrumental apparatus. 
I want to illustrate the consequences of the position taken by Zweigert and Kötz as 
follows: the formation of functional concepts occurs in relation to social problems 
such as housing shortage, to which, for instance, the rules of ‘apartment ownership’ 
are solutions assuming that the legislator cares about the building of apartments. 
Consequently, the comparatist has to investigate the societal impact of different 
sets of rules of ‘apartment ownership’. Specifically, he has to investigate every 
desirable or undesirable effect of the legal rules of ‘apartment ownership’. Such 
rules may promote the conforming behaviour of investors in one society, but may 
not have the same positive consequences in a different society because of 
impediments to the law’s effective functioning. Illustrating one of the most 
important impediments, some ignorance of the law may intervene between the 
promulgation of the law and the behaviour of potential investors. The rate of 
conforming behaviour may vary greatly in the societies under investigation; this 
circumstance turns the formation of functional concepts into an almost arbitrary 
decision. Besides, the comparatist is not limited to those rules legally defined as 
rules of ‘apartment ownership’ since, according to Zweigert and Kötz, the starting 
point of comparison should not be found in law itself. If different rules may solve 
the social problem of housing shortage, the comparatist has to expand his research 
to functional equivalents such as building regulations. 
 
 
4  Zweigert, K. und H. Kötz (1996), Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung, 3. neubearbeitete 
Auflage (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr), p. 11, p. 33, p. 43. 
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Zweigert and Kötz’s functional concepts have their drawbacks since their 
functional approach rests upon several simplifying assumptions concerning the 
relationship between needs or problems of different societies on the one hand, and 
rules of different legal systems on the other. The social effect of legal rules is 
difficult to determine, so in most cases Zweigert and Kötz's functional concepts 
have no empirical use. 
Functional concepts give some insight into the social reality to be regulated, but are 
too broad. Functional concepts may shed light on societal integration, but not on 
connective integration. The formation of functional concepts lead to disregarding 
the substantial differences that subsist between legal systems. Functional concepts 
do not show where the structure of the legal systems of Member States will be a 
serious obstacle to integration. Functional concepts go without the precision of 
legal concepts. 
Immanent concepts 
Analysing legislative definitions5 is an excellent way to detect immanent concepts. 
To find observable criteria for the comparability assumption, the researcher can 
begin by analysing legislative definitions in order to determine the respect in which 
he can compare different legal systems. The definitions of the Dutch 
‘appartementsrecht’ and of the German ‘Wohnungseigentum’ will illustrate this 
seemingly simple preparation of comparative studies. The Dutch 
‘appartementsrecht’ is defined as follows: ‘An apartment right means a share in the 
property which is involved in the division and includes the right to the exclusive 
use of certain portions of the building which, as indicated by their layout, are 
intended to be used as separate units’.6 Section 1 of the German Condominium 
Act7 defines ‘Wohnungseigentum’ differently: ‘Residential property is the separate 
ownership of an apartment in connection with the co-ownership share of the joint 
property, to which it belongs’.  
The important distinction is here that ‘the right to the exclusive use’, mentioned 
only by the Dutch legislator, does not imply the ownership of a specified part of the 
whole building, as it exists in German law. This implies that ‘the right to the 
exclusive use’ does not offer a common perspective, which could be chosen as a 
starting point. By contrast, the legislative definitions allow the researcher to 
compare if he proceeds from the uniform perspective of ‘co-ownership’. The 
comparative concept of ‘co-ownership’ is the unequivocal intension which may be 
part of a comparability assumption. If this hypothesis is verified, it is possible to 
make a real distinction between the Dutch ‘appartementsrecht’ and the German 
‘Wohnungseigentum’. 
 
 
 
5  Legislative or statutory definitions determine the scope of other rules in which the defined 
concept is used. 
6  Netherlands Civil Code, book 5, section 106, subsection 3; translated by P.P.C. Haanappel and E. 
Mackaay. 
7  Par. 1 Gesetz über das Wohnungseigentum und das Dauerwohnrecht. 
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The absence of legislative definitions makes it difficult to choose an immanent 
concept in order to determine the respect in which the researcher can compare 
different legal systems. In a case of absence of these definitions, the formation of 
immanent concepts depends on the structure of the conceptual systems in which 
these concepts have been embedded. If these systems exhibit almost the same 
structures, that is an indication that immanent concepts can be found. However, 
immanent concepts are of no empirical use if the hierarchies of legal systems are 
too divergent conceptually. Comparing the positions of concepts within their 
respective hierarchies is important to determine the relationship of these concepts 
but similar positions do not guarantee any conceptual correspondence fixing the 
comparability of the rules of different legal systems. I will illustrate this matter by 
giving an example that concerns English and French law. 
A common characteristic cannot be found if branches of law do not show sufficient 
correspondence at higher and lower levels. E.g. ‘real property’ in English law and 
‘biens immeubles’ in French law are branches of law missing a common 
characteristic at a higher, more general, level: while ‘real property’ looks to 
procedure, ‘biens immeubles’ looks to substance.8 This fact impedes the 
comparatist in his search for a shared characteristic at a lower, more specific, level 
in the conceptual hierarchies of the respective legal systems. A common 
characteristic cannot be found for the English concept of ‘chattel mortgage’ on the 
one hand, and the French concept of ‘hypothèque mobilière’ on the other. The 
researcher is confronted with a gap when looking for a conceptual equivalent since 
the English ‘chattel mortgage’ and the French ‘hypothèque mobilière’ belong to 
different branches of law. The lack of a common characteristic at a higher, more 
general, level makes the structure of the conceptual systems being compared too 
divergent. First, this implies that immanent concepts are of no empirical use. 
Second, this implies that the structure of the legal systems is a serious obstacle to 
integration of the French rules into the English system or the other way round. 
Degrees of connective integration 
The application of immanent concepts can show degrees of connective integration. 
Since immanent concepts share characteristics common to two or more legal 
systems, the number of these characteristics shows the extent to which the diverse 
elements of legal systems are connected with one another. The following example 
will illustrate this statement. 
The Dutch rules for ‘full adoption’ can be compared to the Austrian rules 
governing ‘limited adoption’ since they share the intension of the immanent 
concept ‘adoption’. One common characteristic is sufficient. In this case, however, 
the degree of connective integration is lower as in the case that more specific 
characteristics are shared by national concepts. Let me explain this by using the 
following example. 
 
 
8  Bell, A.P. (1989) , Modern Law of Personal Property in England and Ireland 
(London/Edinburgh: Butterworths) p. 19; David, R. (1980), English Law and French Law 
(London/Calcutta: Stevens & Sons/Eastern Law House) p. 35. 
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More specific characteristics make the French distinction between the national 
concepts ‘adoption plénière’ or full adoption, and ‘adoption simple’ or limited 
adoption. Juxtaposing articles 356 and 364 of the French Civil Code may help the 
comparatist to find specific characteristics for this distinction: ‘Adoption confers 
on the child a filiation which substitutes for its original filiation; the adopted child 
ceases to belong to its family of blood, ...’; and: ‘An adopted child remains in his 
family of origin and conserves all its rights therein, ...’.9 The first sentence refers to 
the effects of full adoption, the second one concerns limited adoption. Full 
adoption terminates all legal ties between the child and his biological family, 
limited adoption does not. Different legal effects establish the distinction between 
full adoption and limited adoption within the French system. The specific effects 
connected to legal rules could be national characteristics without counterparts in 
the other legal system under investigation.  
In the case of adoption, the testing of the comparability assumption will show two 
common characteristics, so it is possible to determine a higher degree of connective 
integration between the Dutch and the French systems, or between the Austrian and 
the French systems. The French system has specific counterparts in two foreign 
systems under investigation, but the Dutch and the Austrian systems are sharing 
only one characteristic. According to this example, the French system is more 
integrated than the Dutch or the Austrian system. 
Conclusion 
Extensional concepts are not fit to acquire knowledge about relationships between 
legal systems, as has been explained. The functional concept does not aim at 
describing the structure of legal systems, but at the better adaptation of rules to 
ends. Immanent concepts are useful in describing the state of connective 
integration and in showing where the structure of the legal systems of Member 
States will be a serious obstacle to integration. 
Summing up, immanent concepts specify the state of connective integration. They 
enable one to compare different legal systems more accurately in the respects that 
are relevant. In the context of connective integration, they provide a source of 
precise information concerning relationships between legal systems. If the 
hierarchies of legal systems are too divergent conceptually, the formation of 
immanent concepts shows where the structure of the legal systems of Member 
States will be a serious obstacle to integration. Finally, the application of immanent 
concepts can even chart the degree of connective integration. 
 
 
9  Article 356: L'adoption confère à l'enfant une filiation qui se substitue à sa filiation d'origine; 
l'adopté cesse d'appartenir à sa famille par le sang, ... Article 364: L'adopté reste dans sa famille 
d'origine et y conserve tous ses droits, ... These articles have been translated by J.H. Crabb. 
